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POST-CONVICTION REVIEW: QUESTIONS OF INNOCENCE, INDEPENDENCE 
AND NECESSITY 
FIONA LEVERICK, KATHRYN CAMPBELL AND ISLA CALLANDER1 
 
 
Abstract: Alongside a growing recognition of the existence of miscarriages of justice, there 
has been a parallel development of schemes to address wrongful convictions after the normal 
appeals process has been exhausted. This paper addresses the question of what constitutes the 
proper role for such schemes, drawing on a comparative examination of the respective schemes 
in Canada, Scotland and North Carolina. It puts forward four arguments. First, it argues that 
there is a clear need for post-conviction review schemes to operate outside of the courts, 
supported by investigative resources and the power to compel the production of evidence, and 
for them to be independent from government. Secondly, it argues that such schemes should not 
restrict their remit to cases in which fresh evidence emerges, but should be empowered to refer 
cases back to the court of appeal where there has been a procedural impropriety that casts 
doubt on guilt. They should not, however, be permitted to refer cases back to the court where 
there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, however serious the procedural breach concerned. 
While there is a good argument that a court should overturn a conviction where a serious 
breach of procedure calls into question its moral authority to adjudicate, this argument does 
not extend to a post-conviction review body, that sits one step removed from the conviction 
process and that is likely to lose public confidence if it refers cases where there is overwhelming 
evidence that the convicted person is factually guilty. Thirdly, it argues that while there is no 
reason in principle to restrict review to serious cases or to cases where the convicted person 
is living, these are not unreasonable restrictions to place on a scheme if there exist limited 
resources. Finally, it argues that post-conviction review bodies concerned primarily with the 
review of individual applications are not ideally constituted for playing a wider role in systemic 
reform, which would be more effectively undertaken by an affiliated body with a broader based 
membership. 
(16,521 words, including footnotes.) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recognition of the reality of wrongful conviction, a number of jurisdictions have developed 
post-conviction review2 schemes aimed at addressing such mistakes. Our aim in this paper is 
to address the question of how such schemes should ideally operate. Although a range of 
examples of post-conviction review will be discussed, we do so primarily by a comparative 
study of the post-conviction review schemes in Scotland, Canada and North Carolina. Scotland 
and North Carolina are two of a very limited number of jurisdictions that have established 
independent criminal case review commissions, although the scope of the respective 
                                                          
1 Fiona Leverick is Professor of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice at the University of Glasgow, United 
Kingdom. Kathryn Campbell is Professor of Criminology at the University of Ottawa, Canada. Isla Callander is 
a doctoral candidate at the University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. We would like to thank the members of the 
Legitimization of Modern Criminal Law Group, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel for comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper.  
2 By post-conviction review, we mean the system for conviction review that takes place outside the normal 
criminal appeals process – usually (but not always) after the appeals process has been exhausted. 
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commissions is very different. Canada retains a system whereby claims of wrongful conviction 
are adjudicated by a government minister, assisted by an advisory body.  
 
To date, analysis has tended to focus on particular post-conviction review schemes in isolation, 
but by bringing together for the first time the accumulated experience of these three bodies 
(and other examples where appropriate) we argue that there is a clear case for the existence of 
an independent body to undertake post-conviction review. Such a body, we argue, should not 
restrict its remit to cases in which fresh evidence emerges, but should be empowered to refer 
cases where there has been a procedural impropriety that casts doubt on guilt. Such a body 
should not, however, be permitted to refer cases where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, 
however serious the procedural breach concerned. We then go on to argue that, in principle, 
there are no good reasons for restricting the ambit of post-conviction review to serious cases 
or to cases where the applicant is living (although political or resource constraints might serve 
as practical considerations here). Finally, we argue that a post-conviction review body charged 
with the review of individual cases is not best placed to engage in law reform work aimed at 
preventing wrongful conviction at a systemic level. Doing so might compromise its relationship 
with the courts and would require a membership different to that best suited to the review of 
individual cases.  
 
II. POST-CONVICTION REVIEW SCHEMES 
 
It has long been recognised that there is a need for some sort of procedure by which convictions 
can be reviewed outside of the normal criminal appeals process. A number of notorious 
examples where factually innocent individuals have initially failed to overturn their convictions 
on appeal demonstrate that the criminal courts do not always get it right first – or even second 
– time.3 There is also ample evidence, stemming primarily from DNA exoneration projects in 
the US,4 that conviction of the factually innocent is a real and pressing problem. As a result of 
this evidence, we can state with certainty that wrongful conviction does occur and we can even 
confidently identify the main causes.5 Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this paper, 
                                                          
3 To take an example from Canada, David Milgaard was wrongly convicted for the murder of Gail Miller in 1970. 
His initial appeal against conviction was unsuccessful and he served almost 23 years in prison until he was freed 
in 1992 and later fully exonerated through DNA forensic analysis in 1997: see THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE 
EDWARD P MACCALLUM, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF DAVID MILGAARD 
(2008). 
4 See in particular the work of the Innocence Project and the National Registry of Exonerations (NRE). The 
Innocence Project (www.innocenceproject.org) was founded in 1992 and is based at Cardozo Law School. It 
focuses purely on DNA based exonerations and, at the time of writing (February 2017), listed 348 of these. The 
NRE (www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx) is part of the University of Michigan Law 
School and has a slightly wider remit, providing detailed information on every known exoneration in the US since 
1989; at the time of writing 1,976 exonerations were listed. For a detailed analysis of the Innocence Project’s first 
250 DNA exonerations, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011). For analysis of the NRE exonerations, see SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL 
SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989-2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS (2012). 
5 There is a remarkable consensus that the main evidential causes of wrongful conviction are mistaken eyewitness 
identification, false confessions, misleading forensic evidence and the evidence of accomplices or informers (or 
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we also know that in many cases that have subsequently been shown to be instances of wrongful 
conviction, an initial appeal against conviction was unsuccessful.6 
 
This recognition has led some jurisdictions to establish criminal cases review commissions – 
independent bodies which can review convictions and in appropriate cases refer them back to 
the courts for re-consideration. The first and best known of these is the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission for England, Wales and Northern Ireland,7 which was established in 1997 
following a series of notorious miscarriages of justice, mostly relating to terrorist cases.8 Other 
jurisdictions followed, with independent criminal case review commissions also being set up 
in Scotland, Norway and North Carolina.9 For the sake of completeness, mention should also 
be made of the DNA Review Panel that operated in the Australian jurisdiction of New South 
Wales between 2007 and 2014, an independent body that had the power to refer cases to the 
appeal court but that was disbanded after making no referrals.10 Other jurisdictions – such as 
Canada and Australia – retain a variation of the system that existed prior to the establishment 
of the English CCRC whereby post-conviction review is in the hands of a government 
minister.11 
 
                                                          
others who have a motivation to lie): see GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 4, at 165-167; GROSS 
& SHAFFER, supra note 4, at 40. Other environmental and psychological factors also play a role, such as a culture 
of incentivising guilty pleas and the psychological phenomenon of tunnel vision that can affect those investigating 
and prosecuting cases: see GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 4, at 150-153, 165-170, 265-268; 
Bruce MacFarlane, Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of the Justice System, 31 MANITOBA L.J. 403, 436 
(2006). There is a vast literature devoted to identifying safeguards that might be put in place to combat some of 
these factors: see e.g. Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary 
Rules in the Age Of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723 (2012-2013); Lisa D. Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable 
Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 261 (2008); 
Saul M. Kassin, Steven A. Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo & Allison D. Redlich, 
Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010); Fiona 
Leverick, Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence: A Re-Evaluation, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 555 
(2016); Richard A. Wise, Kirsten A. Dauphinaise & Martin A. Safer, A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 
97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807 (2007). 
6 See the discussion in GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 4, chapter 7. 
7 The establishment of the Commission was recommended by THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,  
REPORT (Cmnd. 2263, 1993) ch.11. It will subsequently be referred to as ‘the English CCRC’ to distinguish it 
from its Scottish counterpart. Within the overall jurisdiction of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, there are three separate and distinct legal systems – those of Scotland; England and Wales; and Northern 
Ireland. 
8 In particular the so-called ‘Birmingham Six’ and ‘Guildford Four’: see the detailed account in John Weeden, 
The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 48 CLQ 191, 191-
194 (2012). 
9 The Scottish and North Carolina Commissions are discussed in detail later in this paper. For discussion of the 
Norwegian Commission, see Ulf Stridbeck & Svein Magnussen, Prevention of Wrongful Convictions: Norwegian 
Legal Safeguards and the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2012); Ulf Stridbeck & 
Svein Magnussen, Opening Potentially Wrongful Convictions: Look to Norway, 58 C.L.Q. 267 (2012).  
10 See David Hamer, Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need for a Criminal Cases 
Review Commission, 37 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 270, 292-295 (2014); Lynne Weathered, Reviewing the New 
South Wales DNA Review Panel: Considerations for Australia, 24 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 449 
(2013). 
11 Canada is discussed in detail later in this paper. For discussion of the Australian system, see Bibi Sangha & 
Robert Moles, Mercy or Right: Post-Appeal Petitions in Australia, 14 FLINDERS L.J. 293 (2012); Lynne 
Weathered, Pardon Me: Current Avenues for the Correction of Wrongful Conviction in Australia, 17 CURRENT 
ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 203 (2005). 
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The existence of these different forms of post-conviction review raises a number of questions 
about the proper scope of such bodies. We address these questions by examining three schemes 
for post-conviction review in more detail – those of Scotland, Canada and North Carolina – 
chosen because they offer a range of approaches to the issues concerned.12  
 
The schemes do, of course, have to be seen in the wider legal and political context of the 
jurisdiction in question, but examination of their accumulated experience does generate a 
number of important insights about the appropriate role of a post-conviction review body in 
relation to claims of innocence and the implications this has for the contours of review schemes. 
Before proceeding to discuss the three schemes, however, it is necessary to consider the 
meaning of innocence and how this affects eligibility for exoneration. 
 
III. THE MEANING OF INNOCENCE 
 
The ultimate aim of a post-conviction review body is to offer a remedy to those who are 
innocent of the crime of which they have been convicted, but that raises the question of 
precisely what is meant by innocence. While there is considerable confusion over 
terminology,13 a useful distinction can be made between legal and factual innocence.14 Broadly 
speaking, factual innocence refers to the conviction of someone who did not commit the crime 
in question, either because it was perpetrated by someone else or because no crime was ever 
committed.15 Legal innocence refers to the conviction of someone who should not, under the 
rules of the legal system in question, have been convicted.16 While legal innocence might 
incorporate cases of factual innocence, it would also encompass those who are (or may be) 
                                                          
12 In this paper, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission is selected for detailed analysis over its more 
well-known counterpart, the English CCRC, on the basis that it has not yet been the subject of academic discussion 
to anything like the same extent as the English CCRC. This is despite the fact that the SCCRC has been favourably 
compared to the English CCRC in terms of the greater resources it has at its disposal and the wider powers it has 
to obtain evidence: see e.g. Peter Duff, Straddling Two Worlds: Reflections of a Retired Criminal Cases Review 
Commissioner, 72 MODERN L. REV. 693, 694 (2009); Lissa Griffin, International Perspectives on Correcting 
Wrongful Convictions: The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (2013) 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1153, 1212 (2013). For detailed analysis of the English CCRC, see e.g. LAURIE ELKS, RIGHTING MISCARRIAGES 
OF JUSTICE? TEN YEARS OF THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION (2008); MICHAEL NAUGHTON, ED., THE 
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT (2012); Weeden, supra note 8; David Kyle, 
Correcting Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 657 
(2004). 
13 For differing perspectives, see e.g. Cathleen Burnett, Constructions of Innocence, 70 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 971 
(2002); Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157 (2010); Steven Greer, Miscarriages of 
Justice Reconsidered, 57 MODERN L. REV. 58 (1994).   
14 Although within these two broad categories there are many subtle distinctions. It lies beyond the scope of the 
paper to discuss these, but see the more detailed categorisations in e.g. MICHAEL NAUGHTON, THE INNOCENT AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, 16-17 (2013); Clive 
Walker, Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice, in MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE 
IN ERROR 31, 31-37 (eds. Clive Walker & Keir Starmer, 1999). 
15 Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
21, 45 (1987).  
16 Id. at 45. 
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factually guilty but should not have been convicted because there was a procedural irregularity 
during the process that led to conviction.17 
 
The term miscarriage of justice is sometimes used to describe the conviction of a factually 
innocent person, but it is also the legal test for appeal against conviction in some jurisdictions.18 
In other words, it has a legal meaning (which normally encompasses convictions where there 
has been a procedural irregularity as well as those where fresh evidence casts doubt on guilt) 
but that legal meaning does not necessarily correspond with the way it is understood outside 
the narrow confines of the law.19  
 
It should also be said that factual innocence is something that is often very difficult to establish 
conclusively. The increased sophistication of DNA testing has meant that there does now exist 
a growing number of cases – especially in the US – in which it can be said with absolute 
certainty that a factually innocent person has been wrongly convicted.20 In cases where no 
physical evidence exists, however, the extent to which factually innocent people have been 
wrongly convicted is impossible to determine.21 The extent to which post-conviction review 
bodies should confine themselves to cases of factual innocence and the difficulties that arise in 
defining and identifying this are considered later in the paper,22 which now turns to a brief 
account of the post-conviction review schemes in Canada, Scotland and North Carolina. 
 
IV. THE POST-CONVICTION REVIEW SCHEMES 
 
A. THE CRIMINAL CONVICTION REVIEW GROUP (CANADA) 
 
In Canada the primary remedy for those who, following an exhaustion of the appeals process 
still believe their conviction is in error, is ministerial review,23 the provisions of which are 
found in Part XI.1 of the Criminal Code.24 The right to review a conviction was first introduced 
in law in 1923. After many years of ad hoc review, in 1993 the Criminal Conviction Review 
                                                          
17 There are many types of procedural irregularities that might justify quashing a conviction, such as trial judge 
misdirection, jury misconduct or evidence admitted that was obtained via an irregular procedure. A procedural 
irregularity may or may not cast doubt on the guilt of the accused: see infra notes 151-172 and accompanying 
text. 
18 Including Scotland: see infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
19 See e.g. Sion Jenkins, Miscarriages of Justice and the Discourse of Innocence: Perspectives from Appellants, 
Campaigners, Journalists, and Legal Practitioners, 40 J. OF LAW AND SOCIETY 329 (2013). 
20 See the examples uncovered by the Innocence Project and the NRE, supra note 4. 
21 Zalman has established a generally accepted ‘estimate’ of wrongful convictions in the US of between 0.5% and 
1% for felony convictions (see Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 
48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221 (2012)), but the extent to which these figures translate to other contexts and jurisdictions 
is an open question.  
22 See infra notes 134-148 and accompanying text. 
23 It is also possible to appeal to the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, but such appeals have waned since the abolition 
of the death penalty in Canada in 1976. The Royal Prerogative is not discussed in detail here but see Gary T. 
Trotter, Justice, Politics and the Royal Prerogative of Mercy: Examining the Self-Defence Review, 26 QUEEN’S 
L.J. 339 (2001). 
24 R.S.C., 1985, c C-46 
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Group (CCRG), comprised of a group of lawyers within the Department of Justice, was formed, 
reporting directly to the Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice. In 2002, the conviction review 
process was again amended legislatively, in part due to dissatisfaction with procedural delays, 
secrecy and lack of accountability.25 Changes included inter alia clearer criteria regarding 
remedies, increased investigative powers, movement to a physically separate building from the 
Department of Justice, and the appointment of a Special Advisor.26 While some of these 
changes were in response to criticisms that the CCRG should resemble more the independent 
English CCRC,27 they did not result in any major shift in the way that the CCRG operates. 
 
As it stands today, ministerial review is available for convictions for both indictable and 
summary offences.28 Applicants must have exhausted all avenues of appeal, both at the 
provincial appeals court and Supreme Court levels.29 The information presented in support of 
the application must represent new and significant information that was not previously 
considered by the courts and is reasonably capable of belief.30 Guidelines from the Department 
of Justice in 2003 listed a number of examples of new and significant information that would 
support a conviction review application, namely information that would establish or confirm 
an alibi; another person’s confession; information that identifies another person at the scene of 
the crime; scientific evidence that points to innocence or another’s guilt; proof that important 
evidence was not disclosed; information that shows a witness gave false testimony; and 
information that substantially contradicts testimony at trial.31 
 
When the CCRG assesses whether information is new and significant, the test applied is similar 
to that used by the courts in determining the admissibility of new or “fresh” evidence on appeal: 
it must be relevant, reasonably capable of belief and such that, if taken with the other evidence 
presented at trial, it could reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.32 The applicant 
must, however, also satisfy the Minister that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that “a 
miscarriage of justice likely occurred”,33 given the new and significant information. This is not 
part of the normal test for an appeal against conviction and means that the standard applied to 
conviction review is higher than the test that would be applied at the subsequent court hearing, 
should the case be referred.34 Problematically, no further guidance or precedent is available as 
                                                          
25 Patricia Braiden & Joan Brockman, Remedying Wrongful Convictions Through Applications to the Minister of 
Justice Under Section 690 of the Criminal Code, 17 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3, 20-28 (1999). 
26 MINISTER OF JUSTICE, APPLICATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL REVIEW: MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT, 
3 (2015). 
27 See Canada Gazette, Regulations Respecting Applications For Ministerial Review – Miscarriages of Justice 
Part 1, Vol 136, No 39, 28 September 2002. 
28 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPLYING FOR A CONVICTION REVIEW, 3 (available at http://justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-
jp/ccr-rc/rev.pdf). 
29 Criminal Code, section 696.1(1). 
30 Annual Report, supra note 26, at 6. 
31 These are re-produced in APPLYING FOR A CONVICTION REVIEW, supra note 26, at 2. 
32 Annual Report, supra note 26, at 6. 
33 Criminal Code, section 696.3(3)(a). 
34 HERSH WOLCH AND JOANNE MCLEAN, IN THE MATTER OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION OF DAVID EDGAR MILGGARD: SUBMISSIONS (2008) at para 79.    
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to what might constitute a miscarriage of justice – it is purely a matter of policy for the Minister, 
who does not publish reasons for his or her decisions. As a result applicants have little or no 
idea what might suffice.35  
 
The CCRG’s investigations can involve interviewing witnesses, forensic testing and analysis 
of evidence, and consultation with lawyers, police and prosecutors.36 The CCRG has the 
authority to compel the production of documents as well as the appearance and testimony of 
witnesses.37 The CCRG completes an investigative report, which is viewed by the applicant 
and forwarded to the Minister of Justice.38 If the Minister is “satisfied that there is a reasonable 
basis to conclude that a miscarriage of justice likely occurred”39 he or she may either order a 
new trial or refer the matter to the Court of Appeal of a province or territory as if it were an 
appeal by the convicted person. 
 
At this stage, Crown Counsel of the originating province have a number of remedies available 
to them to move forward, including conducting a new trial, withdrawal of the charges, offering 
no evidence (resulting in a not guilty verdict) or entering a stay of proceedings.40 In the case of 
the last of these, the charges are “on hold” for one year and the Crown retains the power to 
recommence the proceedings on the same indictment.41  
 
B. THE SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION 
 
In Scotland, post-conviction review is undertaken by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (SCCRC). The SCCRC was established in 1999, two years after the English 
CCRC, on the recommendation of the Sutherland Committee.42 Before the SCCRC existed, 
convicted persons who had exhausted the normal appeal process had to apply to the Secretary 
of State for Scotland (a Government Minister) to have their convictions reconsidered, a scheme 
similar to that presently operating in Canada.43 Since its establishment, anyone who has been 
convicted of a criminal offence in Scotland can apply to the SCCRC.44 It can review sentences 
                                                          
35 Which might explain the low numbers of applicants – see infra, table 1. 
36 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPLYING FOR A CONVICTION REVIEW, supra note 28, at 3. 
37 Annual Report, supra note 26, at 3.   
38 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPLYING FOR A CONVICTION REVIEW, supra note 28, at 4. 
39 Criminal Code, section 696.3(3)(a). 
40 Kent Roach, Report Relating to Paragraph 1(f) of the Order in Council for the Commission of Inquiry into 
Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of James Driskell, Appendix F to THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE 
PATRICK J LESAGE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND 
CONVICTION OF JAMES DRISKELL, 21 (2007).    
41 This has been described as “not a satisfactory remedy”: see Le Sage, supra note 40, at 129. See also KATHRYN 
CAMPBELL, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE IN CANADA: CAUSES, RESPONSES, REMEDIES (University of Toronto Press, 
forthcoming 2017). 
42 SUTHERLAND COMMITTEE: CRIMINAL APPEALS AND ALLEGED MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, Cm.3245, para 5.50 
(1996). 
43 Id. at paras 5.3-5.23. 
44 As in Canada, the option of applying to the Royal Prerogative of Mercy still exists alongside the SCCRC but 
applications are very rarely – if ever – now made: see Peter Duff, Criminal Cases Review Commissions and 
Deference to the Courts: The Evaluation of Evidence and Evidentiary Rules,  CRIM. L. REV. 341, 352-355 (2001). 
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and convictions45 and it is empowered to deal with both solemn and summary cases.46 A claim 
does not have to be made by the convicted person – it can be made in respect of a deceased 
person in order to posthumously clear their name.47 The applicant does, however, need to have 
a legitimate connection with the convicted person – victims of the crime or relatives of victims 
do not have standing to apply.48 
 
The SCCRC has nine full time legal officers,49 an annual budget of over £1 million50 to conduct 
investigations and extensive legal powers to compel other parties (both public bodies and 
private individuals) to provide information it deems necessary.51 One third of the SCCRC 
Commissioners must be solicitors or advocates of at least ten years standing and a further third 
must have knowledge or experience of the criminal justice system.52 In practice there have been 
between six and eight Commissioners and two have always been lay members, such as 
academics and figures from the church.53 
 
The SCCRC has no power to quash a conviction but can refer a case back to the court and it is 
then for the court to determine the appeal. The grounds upon which the SCCRC can refer a 
case are that it believes (a) “a miscarriage of justice may have occurred”; and (b) “it is in the 
interests of justice that a reference should be made”.54 The phrase miscarriage of justice is a 
reference to the legal test for determining appeals against conviction in Scotland,55 not to the 
factual innocence of the applicant. In order for a conviction to be quashed in Scotland, the court 
must be satisfied that there has been a miscarriage of justice based on a legally recognised 
factor. Two are specified in legislation: the existence of evidence that was not heard at the 
original proceedings56 and an unreasonable jury verdict.57 Others are set out in case law and all 
relate to some sort of procedural irregularity such as evidence wrongfully admitted or excluded, 
trial judge misdirection or defective legal representation.58 This does mean that, unlike in 
                                                          
45 Approximately one fifth of applications are for sentence review: see SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW 
COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 2014-15, 14 (2016). For discussion of the Commission’s sentence review 
function, see James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission and its 
Referrals to the Appeal Court: The First Ten Years, CRIM. L. REV. 608, 615-620 (2010). 
46 In Scotland, cases can be prosecuted under solemn or summary procedure. Solemn procedure is reserved for 
the most serious cases (known as “indictable” cases) and involves the use of a jury to determine guilt. Summary 
procedure (where cases are prosecuted on a “complaint”) is used for less serious cases. Around a fifth of 
applications relate to summary cases: ANNUAL REPORT 2014-15, supra note 45, at 17. 
47 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 194B(4). 
48 Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission v. Swire, 2015 S.L.T. 556, at para 23 (Scottish High Court of 
Justiciary, 2015). 
49 ANNUAL REPORT 2014-15, supra note 45, at 49. 
50 ANNUAL REPORT 2014-15, supra note 45, at 59. At the time of writing, this equates to approximately $1.25 
million. 
51 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, sections 194H, 194I and 194IA.  
52 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 194A. 
53 Duff, supra note 12, at 694. 
54 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 194C. 
55 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 106. 
56 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 106(3)(a). 
57 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 106(3)(b).  
58 For a comprehensive list see FIONA LEVERICK, JAMES CHALMERS, SARAH ARMSTRONG & FERGUS MCNEILL, 
SCOTTISH CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION 10TH ANNIVERSARY RESEARCH, 18-20 (2009). 
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Canada or North Carolina, the SCCRC is not restricted to looking at cases in which additional 
evidence has emerged – its references can span the whole range of grounds for appeal.  
 
C. THE NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION  
 
The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) was established in 2006,59 on the 
advice of the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission, a body set up in 2002 to make 
recommendations aimed at reducing the risk of wrongful conviction.60 The NCIIC has eight 
commissioners61 and these must include a superior court judge, a prosecuting attorney, a victim 
advocate, a defence attorney, a sheriff, a person who is not an attorney or employed by the 
judicial department and two others.62 
 
The NCIIC will only consider applications from those who have been convicted of a felony in 
a North Carolina state court63 and – unlike the CCRG and SCCRC – where the applicant is 
alive.64 Most significantly, the statutory criteria require that the applicant be asserting 
“complete innocence of any criminal responsibility for the felony”.65 Claims of secondary 
involvement, or of a reduced level of culpability, are not considered claims of complete factual 
innocence. Furthermore, credible and verifiable evidence of innocence must exist,66 and this 
must not have been previously heard at trial or in a post-conviction hearing.67  
 
If, after a preliminary review, the Executive Director determines that the statutory criteria are 
met, the case moves into a formal inquiry phase. Priority is given to cases where the claimant 
is currently incarcerated.68 The investigation phase is a “detailed and lengthy process that 
involves interviewing witnesses, obtaining affidavits, seeking court orders for evidence, testing 
of physical evidence, and compiling of documentation”.69 The NCIIC has substantial powers 
of investigation – it can for example issue subpoenas and compel the attendance of witnesses.70 
                                                          
59 By Article 92 of the North Carolina General Statutes (subsequently ‘NCGS’). The NCIIC is discussed in depth 
in Kent Roach, An Independent Commission to Review Claims of Wrongful Convictions: Lessons From North 
Carolina?, 58 C.L.Q. 283 (2012); Jerome M. Maiatico, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North 
Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345 (2007). 
60 Christine C. Mumma, North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a 
Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647 (2004). 
61 NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE 2015-16 REGULAR SESSION OF 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA AND THE STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL (2015) at ii. 
62 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1463. 
63 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1460(1). 
64 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1460(1).  
65 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1460(1). 
66 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1460(1).  
67 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1460(1). 
68 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1466(2). 
69 THE NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 2009-2010 LONG SESSION OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 3 (2009).  
70 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1467(d)-(f). 
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It also has the power to compel the testimony of witnesses who invoke their privilege against 
self-incrimination.71  
 
If, during the formal inquiry, credible and verifiable new evidence of actual innocence is 
uncovered, the case progresses to a hearing before the eight commissioners.72 Like the SCCRC 
and CCRG, the NCIIC cannot itself quash convictions but can refer a case back to the courts. 
The test that must be met for it to do so is that there is “sufficient evidence of factual innocence 
to merit judicial review”.73 The panel of eight commissioners do not have to agree. A majority 
decision is permissible,74 the exception to this being in cases where the applicant pled guilty, 
which can only be referred by a unanimous decision.75 Unlike the SCCRC or the CCRG, the 
NCIIC has the discretion to make its hearings public76 and even where it does not hold a public 
hearing a transcript of proceedings is made which must be released if the case is referred to the 
courts.77 
 
If the NCIIC refers a case, the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court then appoints 
a special three judge panel to hear it.78 A more stringent standard applies to referred cases than 
to appeals against conviction generally.79 All three judges must be unanimous that there is 
“clear and convincing evidence of the claimant’s innocence”80 in order for the convicted person 
to be exonerated. 
 
V. THE SCHEMES IN PRACTICE 
 
As might be expected, given their different constitutions and remits, the three different post-
conviction review bodies differ considerably in terms of key measures such as the number of 
applications they receive, the proportion of these that are referred back to the courts and the 
‘success rate’ of the referred applications. Table 1 summarises these differences.  
 
Table 1: The Post-Conviction Review Bodies Compared 
                                                          
71 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1468(a1). The Commission Chairperson (a Superior Court Judge), may provide limited 
immunity to the person against a prosecution for perjury. 
72 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1468.  
73 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1468(c). 
74 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1468(c). 
75 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1468(c). This is significant as 40% of applications have been from those who pled guilty: 
see NC Innocence Inquiry Commission Case Statistics, available at: http://www.innocencecommission-
nc.gov/stats.html. For the first two years of its existence the NCIIC did not allow claims from defendants who 
pled guilty at all: see Maiatico, supra note 59, at 1360. 
76 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1468(a). This is also possible at the Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission: see 
Stridbeck and Magnussen, supra note 9, at 271. 
77 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1468(e). For transcripts of the cases that have been referred to date, see 
http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/cases.html  
78 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1469. 
79 Roach, supra note 59, at 286. 
80 N.C.G.S. section 15A-1469(h).  
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Statistics NCIIC SCCRC CCRG 
Applications 1724 
(2007-2015) 
1594 
(1999-2015) 
272 
(2002-2015) 
Applications 
annually (approx.) 
205 (0.7% of 
convicted persons) 
100 (0.1% of 
convicted persons) 
21 (0.008% of 
convicted persons) 
Referral rate 11 convictions 
(0.64%) 
71 convictions 
(4.5%) 
16 convictions 
(5.8%) 
Success rate (of 
determined cases)81 
9 convictions 
quashed (90%) 
33 convictions 
quashed (48%) 
13 convictions 
overturned (93%) 
 
 
A. APPLICATION RATES 
 
The highest application rate of the three bodies is that of the NCIIC, which is perhaps not 
surprising, given that a number of the factors known to contribute to wrongful conviction – 
such as ineffective defence representation and substantial incentives offered to induce guilty 
pleas – are particularly pervasive in the US.82 In its most recent annual report, the NCIIC 
reported that it had received 1837 applications, 1724 of which had concluded,83 an average of 
around 205 claims each year84 (an annual application rate of approximately 0.7 per cent of 
convicted persons).85 The SCCRC’s application rate is considerably lower. As of 31 March 
2015, the SCCRC had received 1594 applications for review of a conviction,86 which over the 
16 years of the SCCRC’s operation is roughly 100 applications for conviction review per year 
(an annual application rate of 0.1 per cent of convicted persons).87 The CCRG, however, has 
by far the lowest application rate of the three bodies. In the 13 year period between 2002 and 
2015,88 the CCRG received 272 applications, which equates to around 21 applications per year 
(an annual application rate of approximately 0.008 per cent of convicted persons).89 The 
reasons for the low rate of applications cannot be known for sure, but a lack of awareness or 
sufficient knowledge about the scheme, the opaqueness of the criteria for review and a lack of 
confidence in the impartiality of the Minister are all likely to be factors. 
                                                          
81 The percentage figures in this row do not take account of cases that are yet to be determined. 
82 See James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Causes of Wrongful Conviction, in POST-CORROBORATION 
SAFEGUARDS REVIEW: REPORT OF THE ACADEMIC EXPERT GROUP 30, 39 (James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick & 
Alasdair Shaw eds., 2014).  
83 NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, 7 (2016). 
84 This figure was provided in the previous year’s annual report (see ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 61, at 9). It was 
omitted from the latest report but remains broadly similar. 
85 The number of persons convicted of a felony in North Carolina was 28,130 in 2013-14 (NORTH CAROLINA 
SENTENCING AND POLICY ADVISORY COMMISSION, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL REPORT FOR 
FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS, FISCAL YEAR 2013/14 (2015) at 13).  
86 ANNUAL REPORT 2014-15, supra note 45, at 14. 
87 The number of persons convicted in the Scottish courts in 2013-14 was 105,549: see SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT, 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN SCOTLAND 2013-14, para 2.1.2 (2014).  
88 It is not possible to obtain figures on applications prior to 2002. 
89 For 2013/2014, approximately 360,000 cases were concluded in the Canadian adult criminal courts. Of that 
number, about two-thirds (63%) resulted in a finding of guilt: see Ashley Maxwell, Adult Criminal Court 
Statistics, 2013/2014, JURISTAT, 28 September 2015. 
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B. REFERRAL RATES 
 
While it has by far the lowest application rate, the CCRG has the highest rate of referral of the 
three bodies. Of the 272 applications, 16 resulted in the Minister concluding that a miscarriage 
of justice likely occurred, a referral rate of 5.8 per cent. The referral rate for the SCCRC is 
similar to that of the CCRG, although it is based on a far greater number of applications. Of 
the 1580 of the SCCRC’s conviction review applications that had had concluded at the time of 
writing, the SCCRC has referred 71 of these to the court, a rate of 4.5 per cent.90 It is the NCIIC 
that has by far the lowest referral rate, although given the far more stringent standard of review 
operated by the NCIIC this is hardly unsurprising. At the time of writing, eleven convictions 
had been referred to the court by the NCIIC,91 a referral rate of 0.64 per cent.  
 
C. THE OUTCOME OF REFERRED CASES 
 
The NCIIC might refer very few cases but of the cases it does refer, the vast majority result in 
the conviction being quashed by the courts. Of the eleven NCIIC referrals, at the time of writing 
one was still awaiting a hearing. Of the remaining ten, nine convictions were quashed at the 
court stage.92 This equates to a 90 per cent success rate,93 although the small numbers involved 
make the statistic of limited value. All of the exonerated individuals had served at least ten 
years in prison prior to exoneration. Four had served over thirty years.94 
 
While very few cases ever make it through the CCRG process, most cases that are referred 
back to the provincial/territorial courts of appeal are successful. Of the sixteen cases95 referred 
back to the courts over a sixteen-year period (1999-2015), four involved the applicant being 
acquitted at the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court. In the remaining twelve cases, a new trial 
was ordered by the courts, but in only one of these was the applicant re-convicted (and that was 
of a lesser charge). Of the remainder, in five cases the proceedings were stayed by the Crown, 
                                                          
90 ANNUAL REPORT 2014-15, supra note 45, at 25. It should be noted that the Annual Report refers to 74 
convictions having been referred, but personal correspondence with the SCCRC indicated that this figure was an 
error and that 71 was the correct figure and the SCCRC’s website now reflects this: see the list of referred 
conviction cases at http://www.sccrc.org.uk./conviction#  
91 Nine cases had been referred but two of these involved two co-accused: see http://www.innocencecommission-
nc.gov/cases.html. In line with the Scottish analysis, the figures for individual convictions are used here rather 
than the case figures. 
92 NC Innocence Inquiry Commission Case Statistics, available at: http://www.innocencecommission-
nc.gov/stats.html. Seven of the referred cases were dealt with by the appeal court as appeals against conviction 
and three by the original trial court as motions for appropriate relief. The distinction is unimportant here, as the 
outcome in all nine instances was that the applicant was exonerated. 
93 The one unsuccessful case was the only one where the referral decision was not unanimous. See State v. Reeves, 
transcripts available at http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/reeves.html. 
94 See the cases of Willie Womble, (38 years), Joseph Sledge (37 years), Leon Brown (30 years) and Henry 
McCollum (30 years): transcripts available at http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/cases.html.  
95 Information on these sixteen cases came from Campbell (forthcoming), supra note 39, and the MINISTER OF 
JUSTICE, APPLICATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL REVIEW: MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 (2011), 
with additional help from Nathalie Vautour, CCRG.   
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one had the charges withdrawn and three cases resulted in an acquittal.96 Overall, this translates 
into a 93 per cent success rate,97 although again such small numbers make generalizations 
difficult. 
 
The figures relating to North Carolina and Canada stand in contrast to those for the SCCRC. 
Of the 71 cases referred to the court by the SCCRC, two appeals were abandoned and must be 
discounted from the analysis. Of the remaining 69 cases, 33 resulted in the conviction being 
quashed, a ‘success rate’ of only 48 per cent.98 While this is considerably lower than the 
relevant figure for either the North Carolina NCIIC or the Canadian CCRG, it does need to be 
understood in the context of the higher number of referred cases and the wider terms of 
reference of the SCCRC compared to the other two bodies.99 Unlike the NCIIC and the CCRG, 
the SCCRC is not limited in its referrals to cases where fresh evidence emerges post-conviction. 
This is the most frequent ground for referral, but it still accounts for only 35 per cent of cases.100 
Even adding ‘failure to disclose’ cases to this (a ground of referral that relates closely to the 
existence of new evidence) gives a figure of only 50 per cent.101 Half of the referred cases are 
referred on other grounds – most commonly errors of law or trial judge misdirection at the 
original trial102 – grounds that would not meet the criteria for referral at the Canadian CCRG 
or the North Carolina NCIIC. 
 
VI. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF A POST-CONVICTION REVIEW BODY 
 
A. IS POST-CONVICTION REVIEW NECESSARY? 
 
An initial question is whether there is a need for post-conviction review at all. Finality is an 
important value in the legal system and the existence of post-conviction review clearly reduces 
this.103 Closure is delayed and increased demands are made on the public purse.104 But in the 
modern era, with the advent of DNA exonerations,105 to the best of our knowledge no-one has 
seriously argued against the need for some form of post-conviction review. It has sometimes 
been suggested that its role should be very limited,106 but the need for ‘closure’ is a very weak 
                                                          
96 In the two remaining cases, the outcome is unknown as they are still before the courts.   
97 This does not include the case where the applicant was convicted of a lesser charge as a ‘success’. If this case 
was included the ‘success rate’ would be 100 per cent. 
98 This rate has fluctuated over time – over the first ten years, the proportion of conviction referrals where the 
court quashed the conviction was 60 per cent: see Chalmers & Leverick, supra note 45, at 616.  
99 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
100 ANNUAL REPORT 2014-2015, supra note 45, at 20-21.  
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Kate Malleson, Appeals against Conviction and the Principle of Finality, 21 J. OF LAW & SOCIETY 151, 159 
(1994).  
104 The Honourable Mr. Justice Peter H. Howden, Judging Errors of Judgment: Accountability, Independence and 
Vulnerability in a Post-Appellate Conviction Review Process, 21 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
569, 583-586 (2002). 
105 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
106 See e.g. David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1027, 1081 (2010); Maiatico, supra note 59, at 1373. 
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argument when put against clear and convincing evidence that someone is suffering a 
deprivation of liberty for a crime they did not commit.107 Such evidence sometimes emerges 
many years later after the normal appeals process has been exhausted108 and justice dictates 
that there needs to be some sort of right of redress for wrongly convicted persons when this 
happens.  
 
One such route might be through an executive system of pardons, like the Royal Prerogative 
of Mercy.109 But it is not appropriate to operate a system where this is the only way to deal with 
claims of wrongful conviction.110 It is a discretionary (and therefore potentially inequitable)111 
remedy that lacks transparency112 and is exercised by a member of the executive.113 In addition, 
and perhaps most significantly, the effect of a pardon is not to remove the conviction, and thus 
its effect is still to imply that the person concerned has done something wrong.114  But, as Smith 
put it, “[w]here a person has been wrongly convicted he seeks justice and not mercy”.115 If an 
error has been made by the criminal courts, the legitimate and just response is that the error is 
rectified by the court quashing the conviction in question.  
 
The question then arises of whether post-conviction review is something that can be effectively 
achieved by the courts alone. In South Australia, the introduction of an independent criminal 
cases review commission was considered, but ultimately the decision was made to establish a 
new process for out of time appeals where fresh evidence of innocence emerges.116 The 
convicted person, instead of applying to an independent body or to a Minister, simply applies 
to the courts: the Statutes Amendment (Appeals) Act 2013 amended the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 to give convicted persons a second or subsequent appeal in cases where 
there is “fresh and compelling” evidence of a wrongful conviction and it is in the interests of 
                                                          
107 As noted earlier (see supra note 94 and accompanying text), in North Carolina, where clear and convincing 
evidence of innocence is a pre-requisite for exoneration after an application to the NCIIC, two of the exonerated 
applicants had served over 35 years in prison. 
108 In Canada, for example, Steven Truscott was wrongly convicted for the rape and murder of Lynn Harper in 
1959. He received the death penalty, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. Truscott’s conviction was 
finally overturned in 2007 following a conviction review of his case. The Ontario Court of Appeal heard new 
forensic entomological evidence that indicated a different time of death for Harper, effectively ruling out Truscott 
as her killer. See Re Truscott O.N.C.A. 575 (Ontario Court of Appeal, 2007).  
109 The Royal Prerogative of Mercy still exists in some form in most common law jurisdictions, including those 
that have established independent criminal cases review commissions: see Jennifer Schweppe, Pardon Me: The 
Contemporary Application of the Prerogative of Mercy, 49 IRISH JURIST 211, 211 (2013). 
110 Whether the Royal Prerogative of Mercy might still play a useful role alongside another method of dealing 
with wrongful conviction claims is a separate issue: for an argument that it does, see Schweppe, supra note 109, 
at 226.  
111 Trotter, supra note 23, at 343. 
112 Sue Milne, The Second or Subsequent Criminal Appeal, the Prerogative of Mercy and the Judicial Inquiry: 
The Continuing Advance of Post-Conviction Review, 36 ADELAIDE L. REV. 211, 212 (2015). 
113 The importance of independence will be discussed further below: see supra notes 122-131 and accompanying 
text. 
114 Trotter, supra note 23, at 344. 
115 Antony T.H. Smith, The Prerogative of Mercy, the Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice, PUBLIC LAW 398, 
421 (1993). 
116 Rachel Dioso-Villa, Out of Grace: Inequity in Post-Exoneration Remedies for Wrongful Conviction, 37 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 349, 374 (2014). 
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justice.117 But, as critics of the South Australian legislation have pointed out,118 this is to ignore 
the difficulties that convicted persons face in trying to obtain fresh evidence of innocence, 
especially when they are incarcerated. As we have seen, the CCRG, SCCRC and NCIIC all 
have considerable powers of investigation and resources to investigate claims. This is an 
important strength of the system in all three jurisdictions and serves to counter – at least in part 
– the disadvantage the wrongly convicted person faces in terms of having the time, money and 
legal powers needed to collect evidence.119 It might be countered that such assistance can be 
provided by volunteer innocence projects, but that is to ignore the superior legal powers that 
the CCRG, SCCRC and NCIIC have to compel the production of evidence from individuals 
and organisations.120 Proving innocence is a daunting task and if a post-conviction review body 
is to operate effectively, it needs to have the power and resources to investigate individual 
cases.121 
 
B. IS INDEPENDENCE REQUIRED? 
 
The next question, if it is accepted that there is a case for a post-conviction review body, is 
what form that body should take and, in particular, whether its effectiveness requires it to be 
independent of government. As we have seen, post-conviction review is carried out by an 
independent body in North Carolina and Scotland, but in Canada the ultimate decision on 
referral is made by the Minister of Justice, albeit advised by the CCRG and its special advisers. 
 
The need for independence is certainly the basis on which some have argued for the 
establishment of criminal cases review commissions in jurisdictions where they do not yet 
exist, such as Australia,122 most US states123 and Canada.124 Further, this lack of independence 
                                                          
117 See section 7 of the Statutes Amendment (Appeals) Act 2013, inserting section 353A into the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935. For discussion, see Milne, supra note 112. 
118 Lynne Weathered, Wrongful Conviction in Australia, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1391, 1410 (2012); Bibi Sangha, 
Robert Moles & Kim Economides, The New Statutory Right of Appeal in South Australian Criminal Law: 
Problems Facing an Applicant - Unanticipated Interpretive Difficulties, 16 FLINDERS L.J. 145, 185 (2014). 
119 Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Towards the Formation of Innocence Commissions in America, 86 
JUDICATURE 98, 104 (2002). 
120 On the question of whether there is still a useful role to be played by Innocence Projects in a jurisdiction with 
an independent post conviction review scheme, see Stephanie Roberts & Lynne Weathered, Assisting the 
Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, 29 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 43 (2009) (arguing that there is); Hannah Quirk, Identifying 
Miscarriages of Justice: Why Innocence in the UK is Not the Answer, 70 MODERN L. REV. 759 (2007) (arguing 
that there is not). 
121 As is illustrated by the case of Kenneth Kagonyera, who was exonerated after almost ten years imprisonment, 
following an application to the NCIIC. He had worked with other agencies in an attempt to secure DNA testing 
prior to his application, but it was only following his application to the NCIIC that this testing (which was to prove 
his innocence) was carried out: see NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 2011-
2012 SHORT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 5 (2012). 
122 Hamer, supra note 10, at 311. 
123 Robert C. Schehr & Lynne Weathered, Should the United States Establish a Criminal Cases Review 
Commission? JUDICATURE 122 (2004).   
124 Four of the six independent commissions of inquiry into the wrongful conviction of individuals held in Canada 
to date have recommended the establishment of an independent entity such as a criminal case review board to 
replace the current system: see Clive Walker & Kathryn Campbell, The CCRC as an Option for Canada: 
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has been proffered as the reason for the low numbers applying to the CCRG in Canada,125 as 
potential applicants with genuine claims may lack confidence that these will be impartially 
reviewed.126 Wrongful conviction can sometimes be the result of State malpractice and it is 
important that a post-conviction review body is free from political pressures in investigating 
such claims. That said, there is no obvious evidence of actual bias in Canada, where the CCRG 
has referred cases involving errors on the part of police officers and Crown Attorneys.127 
 
Even if no actual bias exists, though, perception is still important. As the Sutherland Committee 
put it, a post-conviction review body needs to “command public confidence: justice should not 
only be done, but be seen to be done”.128 There is a danger that the Canadian system does not 
command the same level of confidence in potential applicants (or the wider public) as an 
independent commission would, with the result that some with genuine claims of innocence 
are put off applying.129 The appearance of independence is especially important because post-
conviction review bodies are almost certainly going to reject the vast majority of claims they 
receive, given their stringent application criteria (as is evidenced by referral rates in Canada, 
North Carolina and Scotland of 5.8 per cent, 0.64 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively). 
Independence helps to secure public confidence that the rejected claims were in fact lacking 
merit, whereas rejection by a government minister might leave a lingering suspicion that claims 
are being rejected in order to cover up state impropriety.130 It can also contribute to public 
confidence not just in the post-conviction review body itself, but also in the wider criminal 
justice system. If the vast majority of claims are rejected by a genuinely independent body, this 
is credible evidence that should reassure the public that the police, prosecutors and courts do 
get it right most of the time.131 
 
C. THE TEST FOR REFERRAL AND CONCEPTIONS OF ‘INNOCENCE’ 
 
As we have seen, the three post-conviction review bodies employ very different tests for 
referral of a case back to the court of appeal. At one end of the spectrum, the NCIIC refers 
cases only where there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence. What is more, it limits such 
claims to those who had no involvement in the crime – convicted persons cannot apply on the 
basis they performed the act but lacked mens rea, that they had a recognised defence (such as 
self-defence), or that they should have been convicted of a lesser offence. This narrow 
                                                          
Forwards or Backwards?, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT? (Michael 
Naughton ed., London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).  
125 As noted earlier, the CCRG has received only 272 applications over a sixteen-year period (see supra, table 1), 
far fewer in comparative terms than the SCCRC or NCIIC. 
126 Walker and Campbell, supra note 124. 
127 See e.g. Re Walsh, 2008 NBCA 33 (New Brunswick Court of Appeal, 2008). 
128 SUTHERLAND COMMITTEE, supra note 42, at para 5.30. 
129 Roach, supra note 59, at 288. 
130 Mary Kelly Tate, Commissioning Innocence and Restoring Confidence: The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry 
Commission and the Missing Deliberative Citizen, 64 MAINE L. REV. 531, 552 (2012); Scheck and Neufeld, supra 
note 119, at 100. 
131 Graham Zellick, The Criminal Cases Review Commission and the Court of Appeal: The Commission’s 
Perspective, CRIM. L. REV. 937, 950 (2005).  
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conception has resulted in a referral rate of only 0.64 per cent, by far the lowest of the three 
jurisdictions, but a success rate of 90 per cent when the cases reach court. In Canada the test is 
wider. Cases are referred where there exists new and significant information that was not 
previously considered by the courts and which creates a reasonable belief that a miscarriage of 
justice likely occurred. This would include cases of prosecution non-disclosure, but would not 
encompass claims of errors of law or procedure (such as trial judge misdirection or wrongful 
admission of evidence). The referral rate there is 5.8 per cent and most referrals have resulted 
in the conviction being quashed, with a success rate of 93 per cent, although all of this does 
have to be placed in context of the extremely low number of applications.132 In Scotland the 
test is wider still. Cases can be referred by the SCCRC on the basis that any arguable ground 
of appeal exists, including but not limited to the existence of new evidence. The referral rate 
there is 4.5 per cent and half of these cases been referred on the basis of procedural errors 
(something that would not be possible in either North Carolina or Canada).133 However, less 
than half of the cases referred resulted in the conviction being quashed when the case reached 
court, with a success rate for referrals at 48 per cent 134 a figure far lower than that of North 
Carolina or Canada.  
 
What then should the test for referral be? There is no ‘correct’ answer to this question and to a 
certain extent the answer must depend on the prevailing legal and political culture.135 The test 
used in North Carolina is about as narrow as it is possible to envisage, though, and does run 
the risk of considerable injustice. Those who acted without mens rea or who had a recognised 
justification defence such as self-defence cannot apply but it is difficult to see how they are 
any less innocent in moral terms than those who can demonstrate that they were not involved 
in the incident at all.136 The NCIIC test would also rule out referral if the applicant had fresh 
evidence supporting a partial defence (such as diminished capacity) and excluding these cases 
is also an injustice (although perhaps not to the same extent as excluding those cases where the 
applicant should not have been convicted at all).137 It is not just the fact of a conviction that is 
important but also what the conviction is for, both in terms of fair labelling138 and in terms of 
ensuring proportionality of punishment.139   
 
The focus on demonstrable factual innocence is also problematic. As Roach has pointed out, 
on one level it is appealing, because of the “clear injustice”140 of convicting the factually 
innocent. Wolitz claims that it “serves an important signalling function to the wider public: it 
                                                          
132 See supra, table 1. 
133 See supra, table 1. 
134 See supra, table 1. 
135 Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 119, at 101. 
136 Christopher Sherrin, Declarations of Innocence, 35 QUEENS L.J. 354, 469 (2010). 
137 By contrast the SCCRC has referred a number of cases on this basis: see e.g. Lilburn v. H.M. Advocate [2015] 
H.C.J.A.C. 50 (Scottish High Court of Justiciary, 2010); Kalyanjee v. H.M. Advocate [2014] H.C.J.A.C. 44 
(Scottish High Court of Justiciary 2014). This is also true of the Norwegian Commission (see Stridbeck & 
Magnussen, supra note 9, at 1386) and the English CCRC (see ELKS, supra note 12, at 188). 
138 James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 MODERN L. REV. 217 (2008). 
139 ANDREW ASHWORTH & JEREMY HORDER, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, 19 (7th edn, 2013). 
140 Roach, supra note 59, at 299. 
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assures state citizens that only the most worthy petitioners, those with clear and positive 
evidence of innocence, will be exonerated”.141 It also acts to protect the public, by minimising 
the risk of factually guilty and possibly dangerous applicants being released into the 
community.142 But, as evidenced by the fact that only eleven convictions have been referred by 
the NCIIC since its inception,143 this does need to be balanced against considerations of justice 
to individual applicants. Conclusive proof of factual innocence can be very hard to come by 
even for those who fall into this category, requiring as it does proof of a negative.144 Innocence 
is, as a former English CCRC Commissioner stated, “damnably difficult to prove”.145 A test 
requiring proof of innocence benefits primarily those who have DNA evidence at their 
disposal,146 but this will not exist in the majority of cases.147 The NCIIC itself even recognises 
this, stating that in 20 per cent of the applications it rejects there would have been no possible 
way of demonstrating factual innocence.148 It may be, of course, that this test was the only one 
that was politically acceptable in North Carolina and that if a wider test had been contemplated 
there would have been no way to secure the political agreement needed for the NCIIC’s 
establishment.149 A Commission with a very narrow test is better than having no Commission 
at all, but in terms of securing justice in individual cases it leaves a justice deficit that is difficult 
to defend in principled terms. 
 
A more inclusive test is that of the Canadian CCRG where the focus is on fresh evidence that 
indicates a miscarriage of justice likely occurred (and within that would be included cases of 
prosecutorial non-disclosure). The formulation of the test can be criticised for its vagueness 
and the fact that it is a more difficult test to meet than that applied by the court.150 But it also 
gives rise to a broader question – should a post-conviction review body restrict its ambit to 
cases where there is fresh evidence or should it also be possible to refer cases on the grounds 
that there was a procedural error (such as a trial judge mis-direction or other error of law) 
affecting the fairness of the applicant’s trial? This distinction is illustrated starkly by 
contrasting the Canadian CCRG with the Scottish SCCRC: 50 per cent of the latter’s referrals 
were referred not because of new evidence emerging but because of a procedural error.151 
 
                                                          
141 Wolitz, supra note 106, at 1081. 
142 Maiatico, supra note 59, at 1373. 
143 Cf. Zalman’s estimate of a 0.5-1% rate of wrongful conviction in the US (see supra note 21 and accompanying 
text). 
144 Roberts & Weathered, supra note 120, at 58; Weeden, supra note 8, at 198.  
145 David Jessel, Innocence or Safety: Why the Wrongly Convicted are Better Served by Safety, THE GUARDIAN 
15 December 2009. 
146 Roach, supra note 59, at 301. 
147 Quirk, supra note 120, at 769. 
148 NC Innocence Inquiry Commission Case Statistics, available at: http://www.innocencecommission-
nc.gov/stats.html. 
149 For a discussion of the role of politics in wrongful conviction related law reform, see Marvin Zalman & Julia 
Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV. 955, 964-974 (2014). 
150 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
151 The English CCRC, where the test for referral is broadly similar to that of the SCCRC, also refers a considerable 
number of cases on ‘procedural’ grounds: see ELKS, supra note 12, at 186-190 (the review of homicide referrals). 
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While there may be political considerations that play to restricting the ambit of a post-
conviction review body to fresh evidence cases, there are two principled arguments for 
preferring the approach of the SCCRC. The first is that procedural errors, while they cannot 
provide the proof of factual innocence required by the NCIIC, can certainly cast doubt over the 
guilt of the person concerned.152 If, for example, the case against the applicant was based 
primarily on a confession obtained without the suspect being offered legal assistance and there 
exists little else by way of evidence, then the applicant’s guilt is no longer as clear as it was.153 
Likewise if the jury was not given a clear instruction about how to evaluate identification 
evidence against the accused in a case where the identification evidence was weak, this too 
casts some doubt on the issue of guilt.154  
 
The second reason, however, is unrelated to guilt. Permitting a conviction to stand where there 
is convincing evidence of guilt but there has been a serious error of procedure would, it has 
been argued, harm the integrity of the criminal justice process.155 Integrity and legitimacy are 
both important if the criminal justice system is to retain its moral authority to punish and for 
the public to retain confidence in the system.156 As Spencer puts it:157 
 
the criminal appeals process exists not only to ensure that the factually innocent 
are not punished, but also to uphold the rule of law … [A] criminal conviction 
is only acceptable if it carries moral authority, and a decision reached in 
defiance of basic rules that society prescribes for criminal investigations and 
criminal trials does not. 
 
It is not our intention here to enter the debate about whether a conviction should ever be 
quashed on the basis of a procedural irregularity where there is overwhelming evidence of 
guilt.158 There is certainly a case to be made for the courts to be able to quash the conviction 
of a factually guilty person where the procedural irregularity that took place was so serious it 
calls the integrity of the criminal justice system into question.159 But it does not necessarily 
follow that it should be the role of a post-conviction review body to do so.  
 
                                                          
152 Roberts & Weathered, supra note 120, at 55; Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense 
Lawyer's Growing Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J. OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 315, 324 (2010). 
153 See e.g. M. v. H.M. Advocate [2012] H.C.J.A.C. 157 (High Court of Justiciary, Scotland, 2014), a case referred 
by the SCCRC on this basis. 
154 See e.g. Docherty v. H.M. Advocate [2014] H.C.J.A.C. 94 (High Court of Justiciary, Scotland, 2014), a case 
referred by the SCCRC on this basis. On the importance of jury instructions concerning eyewitness identification 
evidence, see Leverick, supra note 5. 
155 See e.g. Findley, supra note 12, at 1185; BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES AND REMEDIES 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
156 IAN DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 54 (5th edn, 2013); Quirk, supra note 120, at 761. 
157 John R. Spencer, Quashing Convictions for Procedural Irregularities, CRIM. L. REV. 835, 836 (2007).  
158 For a collection of essays on this subject, see JILL HUNTER, PAUL ROBERTS, SIMON M.N. YOUNG & DAVID 
DIXON, EDS., THE INTEGRITY OF CRIMINAL PROCESS: FROM THEORY INTO PRACTICE (2016). 
159 Specifically in the classes of case identified in Spencer, supra note 157, at 842-846. 
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On one hand, Weeden (a former English CCRC Commissioner) has argued that there is a role 
for the English CCRC in protecting “the general integrity of the criminal justice system”.160 
According to Weeden, the English CCRC:161 
 
works to overturn not only the wrongful convictions of those who others believe 
to be innocent, but also the wrongful convictions of those who only may be 
innocent (although others doubt it) and even, indeed, of those who, though they 
seem clearly guilty, have been convicted only after substantial systemic error 
or wrongdoing. 
 
By contrast, the SCCRC, in Cochrane,162 took the stance that it is not appropriate for a post-
conviction review body to refer a case where a procedural error makes no difference to the 
strength of the evidence against the applicant. Cochrane had applied to the SCCRC claiming 
that the indictment on which he was convicted was invalid as the facts specified did not 
constitute a crime.163 The SCCRC agreed, but declined to refer the case. Relying on the second 
limb of its test for referral,164 the Commission argued that it was not in the interests of justice, 
given the overwhelming evidence that Cochrane had been involved in a criminal conspiracy. 
Cochrane responded by petitioning the nobile officium, an equitable remedy of last resort in 
Scotland where no other legal options are available. His case was unsuccessful on a 
technicality, although the court stated that it would also have refused the case on its merits.165 
More significant is the explanation of Peter Duff – one of the commissioners involved in the 
case – as to why the decision was taken to reject it:166 
 
First, the Commission’s primary function is to prevent factually innocent people 
from being punished for offences they had not committed. This was not such a 
case. Second, an important task of the Commission is to foster confidence in the 
Scottish criminal justice system and this would not be accomplished by 
referring, on a pure technicality, the case of someone who was clearly guilty. 
                                                          
160 Weeden, supra note 8, at 199. 
161 Id. (emphasis added). 
162 Cochrane v. H.M. Advocate 2002 S.L.T. 1424 (High Court of Justiciary, Scotland, 2002) (original appeal 
against conviction); Cochrane (Petitioner) [2006] H.C.J.A.C. 27 (High Court of Justiciary, Scotland, 2006) 
(petition to the nobile officium). 
163 He was charged (along with two co-accused) with conspiring to break into a house while his two co-accused 
went on to break into the property and commit a robbery. Housebreaking on its own is not a crime in Scotland – 
it only becomes criminal if committed “with an intent to steal”, but this was not specified on the indictment. 
164 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
165 The application was refused as incompetent because in applying to the SCCRC the applicant had already used 
his remedy of last resort (Cochrane (Petitioner), supra note 162, at para 14). The court noted that it would also 
have refused the application on its merits at para 15. The case is discussed in detail by Duff, supra note 53, at 
706-709. 
166 Duff, supra note 53, at 707. Although cf. Carberry v. H.M. Advocate [2013] HCJAC 101 (High Court of 
Justiciary, Scotland, 2013) where the SCCRC did refer on the basis of a procedural irregularity (the jury in the 
original trial had accessed potentially prejudicial information about the applicant online), despite noting the 
strength of evidence against the applicant. The case might be distinguished from Cochrane, though, in that the 
error was one that related to the evidence available at the original trial. It was not, in the words of Duff, a “pure 
technicality”. 
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It is argued here that the approach taken in Cochrane is the correct one. While it is undoubtedly 
true that an important role of a post-conviction review body is to foster public confidence in 
the criminal justice system, this is not going to be achieved by the referral of cases where there 
is overwhelming evidence of the applicant’s guilt.167 A Commission – or other post-conviction 
review body – sits outside the court system and acts as a body of last resort. It plays a role in 
fostering public confidence and in upholding integrity in the narrow sense of minimising the 
extent to which the system makes mistakes. It does not, however, bear the responsibility of 
securing the integrity of the criminal justice system where to do so would mean the release into 
society of a probably guilty (and possibly dangerous) person.168 It might be said in response 
that integrity – in the broad sense – can be upheld without necessarily releasing the person 
concerned. A referral could result in the conviction being quashed but a retrial (untainted by 
the original breach) being ordered.169  But this will not always be possible or appropriate. The 
breach might have occurred prior to trial (in which case a fresh trial can hardly be said to ‘cure’ 
it)170 or the passage of time or other factors may make retrial impossible.171 But all practical 
considerations aside, the principled argument playing in favour of a court quashing the 
conviction of a guilty person where there has been a serious procedural impropriety – that it 
has lost the moral authority to convict – simply does not apply to a post-conviction review 
body. A post-conviction review body sits outside the court system. It does not lose moral 
authority in the same way and by referring such cases runs the risk of serious damage to public 
support for and confidence in the institution.172 
 
D. THE CASES ELIGIBLE FOR REVIEW 
 
A further question is the scope of a post-conviction review body in terms of whether it considers 
cases regardless of their seriousness or whether restrictions are placed on its remit.173 There are 
no formal limits on the types of case that can be reviewed by the SCCRC or the Canadian 
CCRG,174 although in practice the CCRG has referred only cases on indictment (mostly murder 
and sexual assault)175 whereas the SCCRC’s referrals have included summary cases and 
covered a broader range of offence categories.176 The NCIIC is formally restricted to 
considering applications from those who have been convicted of a felony. 
                                                          
167 Hamer, supra note 10, at 309.  
168 Duff, supra note 44, at 360. 
169 Spencer, supra note 157, at 837.   
170 Spencer, supra note 157, at 837 (giving the example of Mullen, a case where the British authorities brought 
the defendant back into the jurisdiction for trial unlawfully, bypassing the legal extradition procedure). 
171 James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, When Should a Retrial be Permitted after a Conviction is Quashed on 
Appeal?, 74 MODERN L. REV. 721, 726-728 (2011). 
172 This is aside from any questions as to whether this is an acceptable use of scarce resources. 
173 There is also the question of whether a post-conviction review body should consider claims relating solely to 
sentence, but this lies outside the scope of our paper. 
174 Initially the CCRG could only review cases originally prosecuted on indictment, but the 2002 amendments to 
the Criminal Code allowed those convicted of summary offences to request conviction review.   
175 See Campbell (forthcoming), supra note 41. 
176 See the list of referrals on the SCCRC’s website: http://www.sccrc.org.uk/conviction.asp. 
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There is a strong argument in favour of permitting a post-conviction review body to consider 
all types of case, regardless of their seriousness. Mistakes in summary cases are not necessarily 
of less impact – conviction for any criminal offence carries with it considerable stigma: it is 
the “the strongest formal censure that society can inflict”.177 As Hamer puts it:178 
 
For one defendant a first summary conviction may be extremely damaging to 
career, family and relationships, whereas for another, already in prison on other 
unchallenged convictions, an additional indictable conviction may make little 
difference. 
 
Having said that, while there is no principled reason for restricting the ambit of a post-
conviction review body, where limited resources are available priorities have to be placed 
somewhere. Both the Scottish SCCRC and the English CCRC have been permitted to 
investigate summary and indictable cases from the outset,179 but it is notable that, in the face 
of “serious funding constraints”, the UK Parliament’s House of Commons Justice Committee 
recommended in 2015 that the English CCRC be given a statutory discretion to refuse to 
investigate cases dealt with summarily.180 Politics also come into play here. When a post-
conviction review body is first being contemplated, there may be something to be said for 
giving it a narrow scope because this is more politically palatable.181  
 
There is also the question of whether a post-conviction review body should be able to 
investigate cases where the convicted person is dead and the application is made by other 
interested parties such as his or her relatives. This would be ruled out in North Carolina, but it 
is possible in Scotland and Canada.  While no Scottish referrals have been made in such cases 
to date,182 in Canada the CCRG has begun (but not completed) a conviction review on the case 
of Wilbert Coffin.183 There are, perhaps, two possible arguments in favour permitting this. The 
first is that the impact of a wrongful conviction can be considerable for the family of a wrongly 
                                                          
177 ASHWORTH & HORDER, supra note 139, at 1. On the effect of a criminal conviction on subsequent employment 
prospects, see Simone Ispa-Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal Record: Stigma 
Reports Among Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387 (2016). 
178 Hamer, supra note 10, at 309. 
179 This was the case for the SCCRC despite the Sutherland Commission recommending that it be restricted 
initially to only dealing with solemn cases to ensure the new body was not “overwhelmed”: Sutherland Committee, 
supra note 40, at para 5.59.   
180 HOUSE OF COMMONS JUSTICE SELECT COMMITTEE, CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION, 12TH REPORT OF 
2014-15, para 39 (HC Paper No 850, 2015). For discussion, see Michael Zander, The Justice Select Committee’s 
Report on the CCRC – Where Do We Go From Here? CRIM. L. REV. 473, 486 (2015). 
181 Hamer, supra note 10, at 310. 
182 Cf. the English CCRC, which has referred cases of deceased people on the application of surviving family 
members: see Zellick, supra note 131, at 942-944. 
183 Wilbert Coffin was hanged in Montreal, Quebec in February 1956 following a conviction for a triple homicide. 
The conviction rested largely on circumstantial evidence, including the fact that Coffin was the last person to be 
seen with one of the victims and had many items belonging to them in his possession: see Campbell, forthcoming, 
supra note 41. 
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convicted person.184 Although perhaps not as directly stigmatising in terms of being physically 
incarcerated or the direct impact on being able to obtain employment, there is likely to be 
indirect stigma and lingering effects on family members of the wrongly convicted that persist 
after the conviction and also the death of the person concerned.185 Extending the remit to cases 
where the convicted person is dead can, however, raise difficult issues. As a former chair of 
the English CCRC noted,186 the investigation might reveal evidence against another family 
member187 or other information that is embarrassing to the family.188 It may also be the case 
that family members disagree about whether an application should be made.   
 
The second argument is that there may be a wider public interest in acknowledging and 
correcting mistakes made by the justice system, as the Court of Appeal accepted in the case of 
James Hanratty,189 referred by the English CCRC after his death. But Hanratty was a notorious 
case: the public interest is less clear if the case has long since faded from the public memory.190 
The public interest argument is also weaker where the case is not one where the factual 
innocence of the defendant is clear, for example where the basis for the reference is that the 
defendant should have been convicted of a lesser charge, rather than not convicted at all.191 The 
existence of difficulties such as those referred to above are not in themselves sufficient reason 
as a matter of principle to exclude cases involving deceased applicants from a post-conviction 
review body’s remit.192 They do, however, add weight to the argument that if there are scarce 
resources, they may be better directed at exonerating those still imprisoned or living under the 
stigma of a wrongful conviction, rather than focusing on cases involving the deceased. 
 
E. A ROLE IN SYSTEMIC REFORM? 
                                                          
184 As the Court of Appeal for England and Wales acknowledged in R v. Matten, The Times, 5 March 1998 at 7 
(cited in Richard Nobles & David Schiff, The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Establishing a Workable 
Relationship with the Court of Appeal, CRIM L. REV. 173, 179 (2005)).  
185 Adrian T. Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. 
OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 165 (2004); Kathryn Campbell & Myriam Denov, The Burden of 
Innocence: Coping with a Wrongful Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 139 (2004). 
186 Zellick, supra note 131, at 942-944. 
187 As it did in R. v. Knighton (deceased) [2002] EWCA Crim 2227 (Court of Appeal for England and Wales, 
2002). 
188 This might of course also happen if the convicted person is the applicant, but here the personal benefit to the 
applicant of his conviction being quashed would be likely to vastly outweigh any of these other consequences. 
189 R. v. Hanratty (deceased) [2002] EWCA Crim 1141 (Court of Appeal for England and Wales, 2002). 
190 See e.g. R. v. Knighton (deceased) [2002] EWCA Crim 2227 (Court of Appeal for England and Wales, 2002), 
where the Court of Appeal was critical of the English CCRC for referring the case, given that 75 years had passed 
since the conviction (and execution) of the defendant. 
191 See e.g. R. v. Ellis [2003] EWCA Crim 3556 (Court of Appeal for England and Wales, 2002), where the CCRC 
referred the case of Ruth Ellis, the last woman to be hanged in England, on the basis she should have been 
convicted of manslaughter, not murder. The appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal, who questioned whether 
the referral was “a sensible use of the limited resources of the Court of Appeal” (para 90). The English CCRC 
remains convinced it was right to make the reference: see Zellick, supra note 129, at 942. 
192 A third possible argument for allowing the review of cases where the convicted person is dead surrounds the 
notion of human dignity.  Given that legal rules can and do affect dead persons, which are in turn influenced by 
cultural norms and human dignity arguments, it stands to reason that permitting the exoneration of a dead 
convicted person should be a consideration. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 763 (2009).   
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Thus far the discussion has focused on the role of a post-conviction review body in relation to 
individual cases. It has sometimes been suggested, however, that such a body should play a 
wider role in terms of lobbying for systemic reform.193 None of the CCRG, SCCRC or NCIIC 
have played a substantial role in law reform to date. In North Carolina, there exists a separate 
body with a remit to make recommendations for systemic reform, the North Carolina Actual 
Innocence Commission,194 although the NCIIC does cite some examples where its search for 
missing evidence has led to the identification and rectification of systematic flaws.195 In 
Scotland, there is no standing body charged specifically with making recommendations about 
the prevention of wrongful conviction, although such recommendations have been made in the 
context of specific enquiries.196 The SCCRC has occasionally contributed to policy debates, 
but only to those that have a direct impact on its operations.197 In Canada there is also no 
permanent body charged with making systemic reform recommendations, but there have at the 
time of writing been seven major ad hoc enquiries into the causes of wrongful conviction in 
specific cases,198 as well as two broad reviews,199 all of which have made recommendations for 
reform.  
 
It was never envisaged that any of the CCRG, SCCRC or NCIIC would have a systemic reform 
role,200 but such a role was envisaged for the English CCRC by the Royal Commission report 
                                                          
193 See e.g. Maiatico, supra note 59, at 1375. 
194 See Mumma, supra note 60. 
195 THE NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 2011-12 LONG SESSION OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA AND THE STATE JUDICIAL COUNCIL (2011) at 5. In one case, the 
Commission's investigation uncovered a systemic problem with a North Carolina police department routinely 
destroying evidence in violation of statute. In another, the Commission's search for evidence found that evidence 
collection and storage in a particular Sheriff’s Department was in disarray and items were not being properly 
stored.  
196 See e.g. those made by the body tasked with identifying safeguards against wrongful conviction in the context 
of government proposals to remove the requirement for corroboration in criminal cases: THE POST-
CORROBORATION SAFEGUARDS REVIEW: FINAL REPORT, supra note 82. 
197 For example, it intervened in a debate over whether the court of appeal should be given the power to refuse to 
hear a Commission reference: see James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Substantial and Radical Change: A New 
Dawn for Scottish Criminal Procedure, 75 MODERN L. REV. 837, 860-862 (2012).  
198 Six focused primarily on the lessons that could be learned from individual cases: ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE 
DONALD MARSHALL JR PROSECUTION, DIGEST OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1989); THE COMMISSION 
ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN, REPORT (1998); MANITOBA JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING 
THOMAS SOPHONOW (2001); THE LAMER COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE CASES OF RONALD 
DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND RANDY DRUKEN, REPORT AND ANNEXES (2006); THE HONOURABLE MR 
JUSTICE PATRICK J LESAGE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND 
CONVICTION OF JAMES DRISKELL (2007); THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EDWARD P MACCALLUM, REPORT OF 
THE INQUIRY INTO THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF DAVID MILGAARD (2008). The seventh was an investigation 
of forensic paediatric pathology services in Ontario following a number of wrongful convictions caused by 
evidence given by a particular expert witness: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN T GOUDGE, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY 
INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO (2008). 
199 Both undertaken by the Federal/Provincial/Territorial (FPT) Heads of Prosecutions Committee Working 
Group: FPT HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF 
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2005) and FTP HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE PREVENTION OF 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE PATH TO JUSTICE: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2011). 
200 The issue was not addressed in the Sutherland Report, supra note 42 (the report of the body that recommended 
the establishment of the SCCRC) and there would have been no real need for this in North Carolina where a body 
devoted to systemic reform already existed. 
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that led to its introduction. While the Royal Commission was clear that the “primary function” 
of the English CCRC should be to consider and investigate individual cases,201 it recommended 
that it should also “be able to draw attention in its report to general features of the criminal 
justice system which it had found unsatisfactory in the course of its work, and to make any 
recommendations for change it thinks fit”.202 In reality, the English CCRC has done very little 
in this respect,203 primarily due to limited resources,204 although a 2015 parliamentary enquiry 
recommended that this be rectified and that resources be injected to enable it to do so.205 
 
Resources aside, is it a good idea as a matter of principle for a post-conviction review body to 
play a role in systemic reform? Working to improve the safeguards against wrongful conviction 
in a particular jurisdiction is certainly important and a body charged with reviewing individual 
cases might be seen as well placed to develop an understanding of the factors contributing to 
this.206 But the insights likely to be generated should not be over-stated. All of the cases seen 
by a post-conviction review body are historic and some of them will stem from a considerable 
time ago. As such, the legal issues they raise may already be well known and may have been 
addressed.207  
 
There are also other reasons why a post-conviction review body might not be best placed to 
engage in systemic reform work. If such a body intervenes too readily in policy issues this 
might pose a threat to its impartiality that affects its relationship not only with the courts,208 but 
also with the police and prosecutors who might perceive the review body as biased towards the 
interests of the defence. It may also be the case, as Roach has argued,209 that the ideal 
membership of an error correction body is not the same as that of a body concerned with 
achieving systemic reform. Error correction, Roach suggests, requires at least some degree of 
legal expertise as there is little or no point in referring cases that the appeal court will simply 
reject.210 Ensuring such groups have quasi-judicial membership may also be important to add 
legitimacy to the many rejected cases.211 Systemic reform, on the other hand, is easier to 
achieve if there is broad based membership from the range of bodies involved in the criminal 
                                                          
201 THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, Cmnd. 2263, 184 (1993). 
202 Id. at 185. 
203 Carole McCartney & Stephanie Roberts, Building Institutions to Address Miscarriages of Justice in England 
and Wales: Mission Accomplished, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1333, 1359 (2012). 
204 Zellick, supra note 131, at 939. 
205 HOUSE OF COMMONS JUSTICE SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 178, at para 53. It may well be taking heed of 
this. Since this report was published, it has responded to a consultation on the appropriate sentence where a 
defendant has pled guilty: see SENTENCING COUNCIL (FOR ENGLAND AND WALES), REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR 
A GUILTY PLEA GUIDELINE (2016) and RESPONSE BY THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION (available at 
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CCRC-Sentencing-Council-consultation-April-2016.pdf). 
206 HOUSE OF COMMONS JUSTICE SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 180, at para 53. 
207 Weeden, supra note 8, at 203. 
208 Kent Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform or Both?, 85 CHI.-KENT. 
L. REV. 89, 114 (2010). 
209 Id. at 121. 
210 Although cf. Duff, supra note 53, at 719-720. 
211 Roach, supra note 208, at 121. 
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justice system – police, prosecutors, defence representatives and victim groups.212 Politically 
this helps build consensus to see the proposals through in practice.213 But such broad-based 
membership is, Roach states, inappropriate for error correction as it opens up the possibility of 
real or perceived conflicts of interest. For rejected applicants in particular it is important that 
the body is seen as genuinely independent and not partisan towards police, prosecutors, crime 
victims or even the judiciary.214 This is, perhaps, a little over-stated. Some reform exercises 
have certainly stalled due to a failure to build political consensus,215 but this does not 
necessarily mean that a reform group must itself always have broad based membership. There 
are plenty of examples of reform projects undertaken by narrowly constituted groups that have 
successfully achieved change.216 Likewise there are also examples of bodies charged with 
individual conviction review that have broad based membership and are generally perceived as 
successful. The SCCRC, for example, has had an ex-police officer as a commissioner without 
this posing any obvious threat to its relationship with the courts or its perception as an 
independent institution.217 The present chair of the English CCRC is a former Chief Executive 
of the Crown Prosecution Service and while there was some disquiet on his initial 
appointment,218 there is no suggestion that this has caused any ongoing difficulties.219 
 
That said, a body concerned primarily with the review of individual applications is perhaps not 
ideally placed to keep the entire system under review. Roach is correct to suggest that this is 
better achieved at one step removed, by a body or advisory panel affiliated to a post-conviction 
review body.220 Such a body could advocate for change without undermining the error 
correction work undertaken by its sister organisation.221 This approach is an attractive one, 
although given that a post-conviction review body may come across systemic problems in the 
course of its review of individual cases,222 it would make sense for the two bodies to work side 
by side and inform each other’s operations. In taking precisely this approach, despite its other 
flaws, the system in North Carolina has much to be said for it. What is also important, though, 
                                                          
212 Id. at 121. 
213 Id. at 121; See also James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick & Shona Wilson Stark, The Process of Criminal Evidence 
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is that whatever approach is taken there is some mechanism for monitoring the extent to which 
any recommendations made are put into practice. Much is already known about the causes of 
wrongful conviction223 and none of the three jurisdictions examined here are immune from 
criticism in terms of practices they continue to engage in that have been shown to increase the 
risk of wrongful convictions occurring despite recommendations having been made to the 
contrary.224  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Post-conviction review is a necessary part of the criminal justice system when it is faced with 
wrongful convictions. The DNA revolution of the previous three decades has clearly 
demonstrated that the police, prosecutors, juries and judges do sometimes get it wrong; the 
National Registry of Exonerations, for example, lists 1729 known exonerations of convicted 
persons across the US, many of which have been exonerated years (or even decades) after the 
original proceedings concluded.225 These numbers alone underscore the importance of having 
some sort of process, operating outside of the regular court system, to address such 
miscarriages of justice. While one option might simply be to permit out of time appeals where 
fresh evidence of innocence emerges, as has been done in South Australia, this neglects the 
need for a body with the power and resources to uncover such evidence in the first place.  
 
Establishing that there is a need for some form of post-conviction review body is, however, 
only the starting point. The three post-conviction review schemes examined in this paper differ 
in a number of important respects and comparing these different approaches has allowed us to 
draw several conclusions about the proper role of such bodies. The first is that independence 
from government is fundamental – ideally outright independence, but if not, then certainly 
some form of externality. While actual bias has not been demonstrated at the CCRG (which is 
in effect a government body amongst the three schemes discussed), the perception of 
independence is particularly important and its absence, it is suggested here, is a real barrier to 
justice in the Canadian context, and may account for the very low numbers of applications for 
review compared to those at the independent SCCRC and NCIIC. To be effective, it is also 
important that a post-conviction review body is sufficiently resourced, so that it can undertake 
its own independent investigations, and has wide powers to compel evidence. All three of the 
post-conviction review schemes examined here have the resources to investigate claims and 
also have considerable powers to obtain evidence. This is an important strength of the system 
                                                          
223 See the discussion supra note 5. 
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in all three jurisdictions and serves to counter – at least in part – the disadvantage the wrongly 
convicted person faces in terms of having the time, money and legal powers needed to 
challenge a wrongful conviction. 
 
The second conclusion is that restricting the ambit of a post-conviction review body to cases 
in which fresh evidence of innocence emerges is to unjustly narrow its ambit. The three 
schemes examined here operate different tests for referral, which in turn affect their respective 
referral rates (0.64 per cent at the NCIIC, 4.5 per cent at the SCCRC, 5.8 per cent for the 
CCRG). The narrowest is that of the NCIIC, which requires proof of actual innocence and 
which excludes cases in which the applicant lacked mens rea, had a justification defence or 
should have been convicted of a lesser offence. Unsurprisingly it refers only 0.64 per cent of 
the applications it receives. It is not difficult to see that such narrow criteria are a cause of 
injustice, although they may have been necessary to achieve the political consensus to establish 
the scheme at all. The CCRG’s test for referral is wider, but is still limited to cases in which 
fresh evidence emerges, a limitation we argue is also unjust, given that procedural irregularities 
can themselves cast doubt on the safety of a conviction. The SCCRC can refer cases where 
there has been a procedural irregularity – such as a trial judge misdirection about the definition 
of the crime or the manner in which the evidence should be evaluated – and it is right that it is 
able to do so. This should not, however, extend to the referral of cases where the procedural 
error casts no doubt on the safety of the conviction. It is not, we argue, the proper role of a 
post-conviction review body to uphold the integrity of the criminal courts. Such a body sits 
outside the court system and its concern should be with factual innocence – procedural errors 
are relevant only to the extent that they suggest an applicant might have been wrongly 
convicted. 
 
It also has to be said that the test for referral cannot be considered entirely in isolation. In 
referring cases all three of the schemes are bound by what the courts will accept as evidence of 
innocence. While the referral rate for each of the schemes is relatively low, the ‘success rates’ 
for the cases actually referred to the courts following review are much higher. The NCIIC and 
CCRG have a success rate of over 90 per cent, which is perhaps not surprising given the 
stringent tests that cases must satisfy to be referred by these two bodies (indeed the test applied 
by the CCRG is more difficult to satisfy than that for the subsequent appeal against conviction). 
The SCCRC’s success rate is lower, at 48 per cent, but aside from one referral from the early 
days of its operation,226 there is no evidence that it is doing anything other than attempting to 
apply the same test as the court would in determining the appeal.227 It is just that the wider 
basis on which it can make referrals means that it is harder to predict the attitude the courts will 
take to a case. All of this, however, raises much broader questions about whether the system of 
appeals against conviction is expansive enough to provide justice to all those who deserve it or 
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whether some of the strict rules governing, for example, the admissibility of fresh evidence 
ought to be relaxed.228  
 
The third conclusion is that the harm of wrongful conviction is not limited to those who are 
currently incarcerated, those who have committed serious offences or even those who are no 
longer living. (Wrongful) conviction for even a minor offence can have a seriously stigmatising 
effect on one’s life and on the integrity of the criminal justice system. It can continue to blight 
the lives of relatives of a wrongfully convicted person even after his or her death. There is a 
principled case to be made for these errors to be within the remit of a post-conviction review 
body too, although practical considerations of cost and the scarce use of limited resources may 
mean that this is not always achievable. 
 
Finally, the fourth conclusion drawn here is that while these schemes have a specific mandate 
to investigate wrongful convictions, they may not be best placed to engage in systemic reform 
work. Post-conviction exoneration, while onerous and limited, serves an important function for 
addressing wrongful convictions. This is not to neglect the parallel need to identify and 
implement reforms within the criminal justice system to minimise the potential for wrongful 
convictions to occur in the first place.229 The causes of wrongful conviction are well known, 
but there is still work to be done in all three of the jurisdictions examined here to ‘bullet proof’ 
the system to guard against these. This work, while it would benefit from being informed by 
the work of a post-conviction review body, may be better suited to a separate institution with 
a broader based membership.  
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